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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
are placed at the mercy of the plaintiff who may, at his option,
object to the verdict or accept it.9 s
ARTICLE 51 - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND
ORDERs GENERALLY
CPLR 5101: Court still has implied power to grant stays.
CPA § 1520 provided that the non-payer of motion and other
interlocutory costs was subject to an automatic stay of all pro-
ceedings on his part, except to review or vacate the order.
CPLR 5101, which superseded CPA § 1520, omitted any men-
tion of automatic stays as a means of enforcing payment of motion
costs. 19  It was held, however, in Associated Sales Analysts, Inc.
v. Weitz, °00 that the implied, discretionary power to grant stays
for nonpayment of costs in prior actions was not nullified by this
omission.
There are text writers who conflict with the court's inter-
pretation of the legislative intent in omitting that portion referring
to automatic stays in the CPLR.201 It is their opinion that with
execution available under Article 52, a stay of proceedings was
entirely unwarranted as an additional method of enforcing the
payment of motion costs.202 While there is some language to this
effect in the Fourth Report of the Advisory Committee,20 3 there is
no further mention made in any of the subsequent reports.20 4 The
court, however, reasoned that the incomplete legislative history,
which dealt only with interlocutory costs, was insufficient to
support the conclusion that the discretionary power to stay sub-
sequent actions, a common-law power predating the mandatory
stay provisions of the older statutes,20 5 had been nullified. The
court further reasoned that although execution might prove un-
satisfactory, an irresponsible litigant might nevertheless continue
to harass his adversary. Finally, the court noted that unlimited
198 See Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice In New York, 20 CoRNuLI.
L.Q. 269, 271 (1935). In this regard, the plaintiff is presented with a choice
analogous to his power to select his defendants from a number of joint tort-
feasors. 2 WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MunAz, NEW YoRx CivL PRAcncE
IT 1401.02 (1965).
199Associated Sales Analysts, Inc. v. Weitz, 25 App. Div. 2d 64, 266
N.Y.S.2d 852 (1st Dep't 1966).
200 Ibid.
201 See 5 WEmNSTN, KoaR & MIx.Ea, NEw YORK CIMI PRACTICE
1[ 5101.06-.07 (1965); 23 CARMoDY-WAIT, NEav YORK PRACTICE §§302-04
(Supp. 1965).
202 Ibid.
203 FOURTH REP. 226.
204 Associated Sales Analysts, Inc. v. Weitz, supra note 199, at 66,
266 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
205 CPA § 1520, which was preceded by RCP 74.
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execution had always been available to enforce judgment costs, as
opposed to motion costs.
It is important to note that the stay power is discretionary.
The court will take into consideration the merits of the case, the
impecunious status of the litigant, as well as other circumstances
in determining whether to exercise the stay. Lastly, although the
subsequent action need not be identical to the prior action, it must
be shown to be sufficiently similar to it, i.e.:
the common law discretionary power to stay will be available if the
second action has the purpose of seeking some form of relief, previously
available, for the same or substantially the same conduct in the same
sequence of events regardless of the form of action or the legal cate-
gories in which the conduct may be classified.20 6
CPLR 5105: Enforcement of money judgment by contempt held
not to apply to remedial fiduciary situation.
As a general rule, money judgments can be enforced solely
by execution under Article 52.207 CPLR 5105(2) is an exception;
it provides that where the judgment "requires a trustee or person
acting in a fiduciary relationship to pay a sum of money for a
willful default or dereliction of his duty,"208 contempt proceedings
under CPLR 5104 may be employed to enforce the judgment.
The basic reason for the enactment of this statute and its pre-
decessor, CPA § 505(5), was that the law, as a matter of policy,
requires a higher standard of conduct of a fiduciary or trustee
than of a person with whom one deals at arm's length.20 9  As
a consequence, the fiduciary is vulnerable to contempt proceedings
when he violates this trust. It has been argued that remedial re-
lationships such as constructive trusts, 21 0 should be included within
the scope of CPLR 5105(2), giving the term fiduciary its broadest
meaning.211 However, it must be recognized that such an ex-
pansive reading of the term "fiduciary" would greatly increase the
number of exceptions to the present rule, so as to make the con-
208Associated Sales Analysts, Inc. v. Weitz, supra note 199, at 69,
266 N.Y.S2d at 857.
2075 WEiNsTIN, KON & MILLER, NmV YORx CIvIr. PRACTICE 115105.01
(1965).
20s Ibid.
209 See 1947 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 19, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CouxciL 242.
210 These constructive trusts are frequently judicial constructs designed to
secure an equitable accommodation between the parties. The Biannual Survey
of New York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 303, 346 (1966).
211 5 WEINSTEIl, KORN & MILLER, NEiV YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 1f 5105.07
(1965).
